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The field of new governance has generated passionate debate about
the potential effects of its efforts to democratize political decision-making
through the bottom-up production of law. Some analysts suggest that new
governance may reinforce neoliberal efforts to replace the state with market
forms of regulation and control. But predictions about the effects of new
governance's techniques-self-regulation, devolution of state power,
subsidiarity, anti-adversarialism, and so on-are extraordinarily complex:
agents can and do deploy all these means for multiple and shifting social
ends. This Article therefore explores how two of the most innovative
thinkers of new governance, on the one hand, and neoliberal governance,
on the other, themselves understand key conceptual distinctions between
their normative projects. Specifically, it traces the ways in which Charles
Sabel and Friedrich Hayek hold disparate conceptions of three interrelated
ideas: the individual's capacity for reason, the relation between small-scale
organizations and the overall order of society, and the possibilities of
making bottom-up rules of law.
Building on these distinctions, the Article puts forth an account of
new governance that diverges from most contemporary scholarship.
Analysts widely distinguish new governance from liberal legalism-for
example, they describe new governance as a rejection of the kind of
centralized legal regulation favored by liberal advocates of the New Deal
state, and as an embrace of informal, flexible, lay, and even extralegal
problem solving. This Article, however, explores new governance as an
effort to bring formalizing and law-like procedures to bear on Hayekian
models of flexible organization. It suggests that studying the discontinuities
between new governance and neoliberalism-and the continuities between
new governance and liberal legalism-may help clarify ongoing questions
about new governance's view of law as a tool of distribution and social
change.
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INTRODUCTION
The field of new governance has generated passionate debate about
the distributional effects of its efforts to democratize political decision-
making through the bottom-up production of law. New governance
proposes to devolve state power to non-state actors to generate the rules
and norms that will govern their own behaviors and practices.' Several
scholars, however, have cautioned that new governance is unlikely to
redistribute political power as it claims.2 To the contrary, various
analysts have observed conceptual overlaps between new governance
and neoliberal critiques of the welfare state; 3 some have suggested that
1. See, e.g., Christine Parker, The Pluralization of Regulation, 9
THEORETICAL INQUIRIEs L. 349 (2008).
2. For a smattering of criticisms, see, e.g., Lisa T. Alexander, Stakeholder
Participation in New Governance: Lessons From Chicago's Public Housing Reform
Experiment, 16 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 117, 131-32 (2009) (suggesting that
new governance's decentralized and soft-law mechanisms are unlikely to protect the
interests of disadvantaged groups); Susan D. Carle, Progressive Lawyering in
Politically Depressing Times: Can New Models for Institutional Self-Reform Achieve
More Effective Structural Change?, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 323, 333 (2007)
(critically examining the progressive potential of new governance measures that
"bypass courts and legislatures"); Helen Hershkoff & Benedict Kingsbury, Crisis,
Community, and Courts in Network Governance: A Response to Liebman and Sabel's
Approach to Reform of Public Education, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 319, 322
(2003) (predicting that without greater attention to state-enforced rights, governance
networks may become exclusive and non-transparent); john a. powell & Marguerite L.
Spencer, Brown is Not Brown and Educational Reform is Not Reform if Integration is
Not a Goal, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 343, 347 (2003) (arguing that new
governance approaches to education reform represent "the triumph of process over
substance"); C6sar A. Rodriguez-Garavito, Global Governance and Labor Rights:
Codes of Conduct and Anti-Sweatshop Struggles in Global Apparel Factories in Mexico
and Guatemala, 33 POL. & Soc'Y 203, 205 (2005) (criticizing the "the governance
paradigm" for paying insufficient attention to "the problems created by large power
asymmetries among the nonstate actors ... who are supposed to engage in deliberation
and collaboration within governance systems"); David Super, Laboratories of
Destitution: Democratic Expeinentalism and the Failure of Antipoverty Law, 157 U.
PENN. L. REV 541, 542, 545 (2009) (insisting that to address poverty in the United
States, planners need centralized policymaking, not the decentralized participatory
decision-making promoted by new governance); Annecoos Wiersema, A Train Without
Tracks: Rethinking the Place of Law and Goals in Environmental and Natural
Resources Law, 38 ENVTL L. 1239 (2008) (arguing that new governance approaches to
resource management cannot ensure long-term environmental protection).
3. See, e.g., Douglas NeJaime, When New Governance Fails, 70 OHIO ST.
L.J. 323, 343 (2009) ("New Governance resonates with neo-liberalism; the impulse
toward less centralized regulation and an appeal to privatization reflects neo-liberal
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new governance stands to reinforce broader efforts to replace state-
enforced rights and entitlements with market forms of regulation and
control.' But predictions about the politics of new governance's
techniques-self-regulation and self-monitoring, citizen participation,
horizontality, subsidiarity, benchmarking, anti-adversarialism, and so
on-are extraordinarily complex: agents can and do deploy all these
means for a shifting range of social ends.'
This short Article therefore explores how two of the most
important and innovative thinkers of new governance, on the one hand,
and neoliberal governance, on the other, themselves understand key
conceptual distinctions between their normative projects. To that end, I
begin by describing a 1995 conference paper by Charles Sabel that
leaves little doubt about Sabel's overwhelming influence on the
development of new governance.' Sabel's early paper is stunningly
comprehensive-there is virtually no element of the contemporary
ideals which have enjoyed currency in the American post-welfare state."); see also
Scott Burris et al., Changes in Governance: A Cross-Disciplinary Review of Current
Scholarship, 41 AKRON L. REv. 1, 20, 48 (2008) (discussing features, such as
subsidiarity and public-private partnerships, that new governance and neoliberalism
share in common); Joel Handler et al., A Roundtable on New Legal Realism,
Microanalysis of Institutions, and the New Governance: Exploring Convergences and
Differences, 2005 Wis. L. REV. 479, 511 (David Sugarman's remarks, observing that
"governance is a linguistic politics . . . associated with the 'third way,' with particular
versions of neoliberalism").
4. See, e.g., Ronen Shamir, The Age of Responsibilization: On Market-
Embedded Morality, 37 EcoN. & Soc'Y 1, 7-8 (2008) (linking new governance ideas
to the decline of state responsibility and the expansion of individual responsibility
shaped by cost-benefit calculations); see also William E. Scheuerman, Democratic
Experimentalism or Capitalist Synchronization? Critical Reflections on Directly-
Deliberative Polyarchy, 17 CANANDIAN J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 101, 125-26 (2004)
(noting "the uglier facets of a system of capitalism organized according to the principles
of benchmarking, concomitant engineering, and independent monitoring" and
questioning the social consequences if new governance succeeds in using these
principles to reorganize state regulation); Hershkoff & Kingsbury, supra note 2, at 321-
23 (discussing new governance's conceptual roots in industry and management and
arguing that, as applied to social policy, new governance may intensify inequalities and
undermine social values that defy quantification).
5. See, e.g., JOEL F. HANDLER, DowN FROM BUREAUCRACY: THE
AMBIGUITY OF PRIVATIZATION AND EMPOWERMENT (1996); Boaventura de Sousa Santos,
Beyond Neoliberal Governance: The World Social Forum as Subaltern Cosmopolitan
Politics and Legality, in LAW AND GLOBALIZATION FROM BELOW: TOWARDS A
COSMOPOLITAN LEGALYTY 43 (Boaventura de Sousa Santos & C6sar A. Rodriguez-
Garavito eds., 2005).
6. Charles F. Sabel, Design, Deliberation, and Democracy: On the New
Pragmatism of Firms and Public Institutions (paper presented to the Conference on
Liberal Institutions, Economic Constitutional Rights, and the Role of Organizations,
European Univ. Inst., Dec. 15-16, 1995), in LIBERAL INSTITUTIONS, ECONOMIC
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, AND THE ROLE OF ORGANIZATIONS 101 (Karl-Heinz Ladeur
ed., 1997), available at http://www2.law.columbia.edu/sabel/papers/Design.html.
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project that we cannot already find prefigured in its pages. But this
paper also develops a crucial point that is absent from later writings:
Sabel fashioned new governance partially by invoking but also by
critically disavowing the ideas of Nobel laureate and economic
philosopher Friedrich Hayek-the theorist widely credited as the father
of contemporary neoliberalism, with his blustery attacks on government
planning, social redistribution, and the welfare state.' Sabel in fact
suggested that Hayek inspired "the most promising" but ultimately
flawed program for democratic reform.9
By comparing Sabel's critique of Hayek with Hayek's own
writings, I trace the ways in which these two thinkers hold disparate
conceptions of three interrelated ideas: the individual's capacity for
reason, the relation between small-scale organizations and the overall
order of society, and the possibilities of making bottom-up rules of law.
I illustrate, moreover, how these differences inform the governance
techniques that they alternatively endorse, as well as their predictions
about the sorts of normative ends they anticipate will follow.
By distinguishing Sabel-inspired new governance from Hayek-
inspired neoliberalism, this Article also offers a picture of new
governance that is missing from contemporary scholarship. Numerous
analysts distinguish new governance not from neoliberalism but rather
from left-of-center liberal legalism.'o They describe new governance as
a turn away from the kind of centralized command-and-control
regulation favored by liberal advocates of the New Deal welfare state,
and as a turn toward informal, flexible, lay, and even extralegal
7. In this paper, Sabel develops new governance through a partial invocation
and partial rejection of Hayek, on the one hand, and Durkheim, on the other. My
Article, however, addresses only Sabel's engagement with Hayek.
8. See, e.g., Rachel S. Turner, The "Rebirth of Liberalism"' The Origins of
Neo-Liberal Ideology, 12 J. POL. IDEOLOGIES 67, 69-71 (2007). Hayek himself
acknowledged that "Americans have done me the honour of considering the publication
of The Road to Serfdom as the decisive date . . . [of bringing] about the rehabilitation
of the idea of personal freedom especially in the economic realm." Id at 78. Fittingly,
he subtitled his three-volume work on law "a new statement of the liberal principles of
justice and political economy." 1-3 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND
LIBERTY (1973, 1976, 1979) (emphasis added).
9. Sabel, Design, Deliberation, and Democracy, supra note 6, at 132.
10. I intend the term "liberal legalism" to approximate what William Simon
broadly describes as legal liberalism, that is, "a cluster of ideas associated with the
Warren Court, the ACLU, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, Ralph Nader, and the
legal aid and public defender movements." William H. Simon, Solving Problems vs.
Claiming Rights: The Pragmatist Challenge to Legal Liberalism, 46 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 127, 127 (2004). See also Jason M. Solomon, Law and Governance in the 21st
Century Regulatory State, 86 TEX. L. REv. 819, 827 (2008) (describing new governance




collaboration and problem solving-thus laying the groundwork for
comparisons between new governance and the informalization and
privatization promoted by neoliberalism. But Sabel's early engagement
with Hayek suggests that we should also understand new governance as
a set of formalizing, reason-seeking, indeed law-seeking revisions to
Hayekian models of informal flexible organization and, hence, as a
vision of law and social order that holds far more in common with
liberal than neoliberal legalism."
This Article proceeds in four parts. In Part I, I outline the points
of convergence and divergence between Sabel and Hayek, and then I
link these points to competing ideas about selfhood and social
organization in Part II, and bottom-up lawmaking in Part III. In
conclusion, I compare new governance and Hayekian conceptions of
accountability and justice. This final comparison is the most general
and the most dependent upon the analytical distinctions worked out in
the preceding Parts and serves as my conclusion. It suggests that
emphasizing the continuities rather than the gaps between new
governance and liberal legalism helps to clarify ongoing questions
within the field about the role of law as a tool of distribution and
progressive social change.
I. TACIT KNOWLEDGE AND FORMAL RULES
Several commentators have noted commonalities between new
governance and Hayek-most frequently, their emphasis on
unknowingness as an intrinsic feature of human life.12 Indeed, both
Sabel and Hayek built their respective projects of political governance
out of insights about the limits of individual knowledge and their shared
claim that none of us can dictate complete solutions to social problems.
And both used these insights to justify their assertion that government
should decline from imposing prior substantive or distributional ends.
Hayek, for example, famously claimed that we are all necessarily
and irremediably ignorant of "most of the particular facts which
determine the actions of all the several members of human society." 3
11. A brief note on this potentially confusing terminology: the first usage of
the term liberal is intended to signify a (peculiarly United Statesian) association with
progressive social-legal ideals. See, e.g., supra note 10. By contrast, the second usage
broadly signifies a reconstruction of ideas of individual freedom promoted in
neoclassical economics and classical legal thought. See, e.g., supra note 8. See
generally infra Part III.
12. See infra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
13. 1 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: RULES AND
ORDER 12 (1973) [hereinafter HAYEK, 1 LAw, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY]; See generally
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For him, government's primary function was therefore not to direct
individual action but rather to ensure that individuals can surpass the
limits of their ignorance by utilizing dispersed bits of knowledge
possessed by their neighbors.14 "All we can hope to secure," he argued,
is a procedure that is on the whole likely to bring about a
situation where more of the potentially useful objective facts
will be taken into account than would be done in any other
procedure which we know . . . [and that] best assist[s] the
optimum utilization of the knowledge, skills and opportunities
to acquire knowledge, that are dispersed among hundreds of
thousands of people, but given to nobody in their entirety."
New governance begins with a very similar claim. As Michael
Dorf puts it: "people increasingly find that their problem is not so much
an inability to persuade those with different interests or viewpoints of
what to do; their problem is that no one has a complete solution to what
collectively ails them."" As a result, new governance scholars propose
to replace top-down regulation with institutions designed to collect and
pool local knowledge." These institutions aim to enable, but also to
require, individuals to pursue joint solutions to public problems by
building on the dispersed knowledge of others-guided by state
supervision, but not direct or centralized state control. Thus, for
example, John Braithwaite explains that an unmistakably "Hayekian
analysis of impoverished local knowledge under state planning" informs
contemporary strands of new governance.'" And Philip Alston and
James Heenan observe that defenders of new governance style
regulation claim that "[t]he rights approach or fixed principles approach
... [will] fail in part because it is unable to take account of all relevant
contextual considerations or to adjust to unintended consequences. In
FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 22-38 (1960) [hereinafter
HAYEK, CONSTITUTION].
14. See HAYEK, 1 LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY, supra note 13, at 12-15.
15. 3 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: THE POLITICAL
ORDER OF A FREE PEOPLE 68 (1979) [hereinafter HAYEK, 3 LAW, LEGISLATION AND
LBERTY].
16. Michael C. Dorf, After Bureaucracy, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 1245, 1269
(2004).
17. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of
Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 267, 317 (1998).
18. John Braithwaite, Methods of Power for Development: Weapons of the
Weak, Weapons of the Strong, 26 MICH. J. INT'L L. 297, 308 (2004) (describing work
by Clifford Shearing and others that draws on Dorf and Sabel's scholarship).
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that respect, the analysis is remarkably similar to that of Friedrich
Hayek . . ."19
But despite these overarching similarities, new governance and
Hayek diverge widely on how they understand-and how they propose
to manage-the limits of human knowledge and, accordingly, how they
understand the possibilities of political governance. As Sabel knew
well, Hayek did not simply argue, as new governance scholars often
do, that knowledge is fragmented, diffuse, and contextual; Hayek also
argued that human knowledge is very often tacit.20 Hayek suggested
that people-particularly as they engage in intensively interactive
practices with others-come to know many things that they cannot
consciously explain to others or even to themselves. 2' Government,
Hayek claimed, should therefore delineate permissible spheres of action
so that individuals can freely utilize their knowledge to coordinate their
tasks and pursue their purposes.22 But because individuals are limited in
their abilities to generate explicit formulations about their purposes,
capabilities, and skills, government should not expect that individuals
will make their knowledge the subject of conscious reflection or
intentional debate. Rather, government should assume that through
informal social processes individuals will spontaneously create things
greater than anyone could deliberately design or consciously foresee.23
For this reason, Hayek advocated a system of state governance that
enforces formal rules at a high level of abstraction-what he often
called rules of just conduct (and described, for example, as field
defining rules of property and contract).24 Only abstract formal rules,
Hayek claimed, with no purpose other than informing people how they
19. Philip Alston & James Heenan, Shrinking the International Labor Code:
An Unintended Consequence of the 1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles
and Rights at Work?, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 221, 250, 249-51 (2004)
(describing Sean Cooney's pragmatist approach to labor regulation and its reliance on
Sabel's work among others).
20. See, e.g., Sabel, Desgn, Deliberation, and Democracy, supra note 6, at
107-08.
21. See, e.g., HAYEK, 1 LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY, supra note 13, at
11-12, 19.
22. F.A. HAYEK, NEW STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND
THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 77 (1978).
23. See, e.g., HAYEK, CONSTITUTION, supra note 13, at 159-61 (describing
polycentric orders).
24. See, e.g., id. at 148-61; F.A. HAYEK, THE FATAL CONCEIT: THE ERRORS
OF SOCIALISM 63 (1988); 2 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY:
THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 16-17 (1976) [hereinafter HAYEK, 2 LAW, LEGISLATION
AND LIBERTY].
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may permissibly pursue their own purposes, could plausibly achieve
spontaneous or self-generated social ends.25
Sabel's vision of governance borrows Hayek's idea that the state
should cultivate environments conducive to learning, experimentation,
adaptability, and growth.2 6 Moreover, Sabel shares Hayek's argument
that individuals evolve their interests and preferences though social
interactions with others, and that decentralization is therefore necessary
to ensure that diffuse local knowledge and interests are effectively
used.27 For example, Sabel suggests that new governance mobilizes
"the contextual intelligence that only citizens possess" through
"practical deliberation" about shared social problems." And like
Hayek, Sabel plainly rejects the post-war promise that planners can
engineer adequate responses to complex social questions from above.
But by emphasizing the possibility of citizen deliberation about
problems, Sabel also rejects what he describes as Hayek's distinction
between tacit knowledge and abstract formal rules-that is, between
"tacit knowledge that guides local action yet cannot be formalized and
formal rules that coordinate action at a distance."29 In other words,
Hayek supposed that given the tacit nature of a great deal of human
knowledge, formal rules framed at a high level of abstraction should
demarcate only the boundaries of permissible individual conduct (and
25. See, e.g., HAYEK, 1 LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY, supra note 13, at
112-13; HAYEK, 2 LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY, supra note 24, at 114. Hayek
argues further that we should understand rules of just conduct "not as means but as
ultimate values, indeed as the only values common to all and distinct from the particular
ends of the individuals." Id. at 17.
26. See, e.g., Dorf & Sabel, supra note 17, at 314-15. Hayek famously
claimed that
[ilf man is not to do more harm than good in his efforts to improve the
social order, he . . . will therefore have to use what knowledge he can
achieve, not to shape the results as the craftsman shapes his handiwork, but
rather to cultivate a growth by providing the appropriate environment, in
the manner in which the gardener does this for his plants.
HAYEK, NEW STUDIES, supra note 22, at 34.
27. See, e.g., Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Epilogue:
Accountability Without Sovereignty, in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND
US 395, 402 (Grdinne de Bfirca & Joanne Scott eds., 2006) (describing "directly
deliberative problem solving"); see also FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND
ECONOMIC ORDER 15 (1948) (rejecting the "presumption that each man knows his
interest best" because "nobody can know who knows best . . . the only way by which
we can find out is through a social process in which everybody is allowed to try and see
what he can do").
28. Charles Sabel, Archon Fung, & Bradley Karkkainen, Beyond Backyard
Environmentalism, in BEYOND BACKYARD ENVIRONMENTALISM 3, 6-7 (Joshua Cohen &
Joel Rogers eds., 2000).
29. Sabel, Design, Deliberation, and Democracy, supra note 6, at 103.
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not attempt actively to structure conduct within those boundaries).
Abstract formal rules, he explained, are the necessary and sufficient
conditions for otherwise informal and tacit flexible coordination among
individuals. By contrast, Sabel argued that government could play a far
more interventionist role in social and economic life. He suggested that
discursive micro rules framed at a high level of specificity (not
abstraction) could regulate how individuals act flexibly in informal
processes-and, indeed, make possible the "precise, joint determination
of [their] activity." 30 Rules that set reason-giving and other kinds of
speech requirements to rationalize individual conduct could tell people
how to make their knowledge explicit and accessible to others so that
local actors could set their own ends and means but always through
transparent and accountable action.3 Thus whereas Hayek's theory of
governance by abstract formal rules assumes that individuals are limited
in their capacity to make explicit formulations, Sabel's theory of
governance via specific discursive rules depends upon exactly the
opposite presumption.
To justify his alternate vision, Sabel argued that Hayek's thesis
about the limits of explicit discourse was not only unduly pessimistic
but also disproved by recent developments in industrial society,
specifically, the emergence of new flexible firms. These firms, which
emerged in Japan, Italy, and other industrialized economies in the latter
part of the twentieth century, did not rely on Fordist-style assembly
lines. Rather they divided work among specialized teams whose tasks
were not static but instead constantly responsive to changing market
demands.32 Sabel claimed that these new firms demonstrated, contrary
to Hayek's argument, that collective work teams could organize
themselves according to explicit, not merely tacit, rationality. By
"allow[ing] each part of a collaborative whole to reflect deliberately,
and in a way accessible to the others, on the aptness of its ends and the
organizational means used to prosecute them" these firms revealed, he
argued, how social organization could emerge out of what he described
as maximally formalized flexibility.3
30. Id. at 122-25, 127.
31. See id. at 120-30, 138-43.
32. See generally MICHAEL J. PIORE & CHARLES F. SABEL, THE SECOND
INDUSTRIAL DIVIDE: POSSIBILITIES FOR PROSPERITY 194-250 (1984); Charles F. Sabel,
Learning by Monitorng: The Institutions of Economic Development, in THE
HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY 137 (Neil J. Smelser & Richard Swedberg eds.,
1994), available at http://www.law.columbia.edu/null/Working +paper+No?
exclusive = filemgr.download&file id=64129&showthumb=0; see also RICHARD
SENNETT, THE CORROSION OF CHARACTER: THE PERSONAL CONSEQUENCES OF WORK IN
THE NEW CAPITALISM 47-59 (1998).
33. Sabel, Design, Deliberation, and Democracy, supra note 6, at 103.
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Sabel's descriptions of these firms, and the "practical reasoning"
they enable and produce, bear only brief repeating here. A provisional
design (such as for a car) is fractionated into its component parts,
which are tasked among work teams. Each team compares its parts to
models on the market or to new or unexpected developments. As each
team modifies the design of its part, it invariably offers new proposals
for the design of the whole. During this process of "iterated goal
setting," each team continuously compares its performance with that of
others to determine whose contributions are necessary and efficient.
Each team must therefore repeatedly express and justify its actions to
its peers-hence "learning-by-monitoring." 34
In Sabel's analysis, this system of maximally formalized flexibility
is made possible for two reasons. First, all knowledge is made explicit;
there is "no place [in the new institutions] for tacit knowledge . . . that
defies discussion."" Second, the rules governing the articulation of
knowledge are intrusive-they impose highly specific behavioral
regularities on all the workers.3 6 But although these rules affirmatively
specify how conduct should be performed, they do so ambiguously. As
a result, the rules coordinating activity require interpretative elaboration
by the workers, and, moreover, anticipate that their explicit elaboration
will result in the revision of the rules themselves."
Sabel contrasted his account of the new firm with what he
described as Hayekian accounts of "minimally formalized flexibility." 3 8
Here "knowledge is tacit: the actors are sure of what they do, but
cannot say how."" Although each actor depends on the knowledge of
others, their shared practice is produced through informal enculturation
and socialization rather than through critical reflection and intentional
debate. Innovations happen, discoveries emerge, and "[t]hought
progresses, but never in a way that allows explicit knowledge of [their]
motor mechanism."' Rules are not intrusive and ambiguous but rather
unobtrusive and fixed; they "regulate relations among the jurisdictions
34. Id. at 105, 120-25. For other detailed accounts, see Sabel, Learning by
Monitonng, supra note 32; Dorf & Sabel, supra note 17, at 286-88, 297-313; William
H. Simon, Toyota Jurisprudence: Legal Theory and RollMg Rule Regimes, in LAW AND
NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US 37 (Grdinne de Bdirca & Joanne Scott eds.,
2006).
35. Sabel, Design, Deliberation, and Democracy, supra note 6, at 128.
36. Id. at 124; see also id. at 120 ("[N]ew economic organizations . . .
depend on an institutional framework that is much more intrusive in its formal
regulation of cooperation than any system of rules sanctioned in the Hayekian view.").
37. Id. at 124.
38. Id. at 122.
39. Id. at 123.
40. Id. at 115-18 (describing "microscopic Hayekian accounts of flexibility").
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within which various types of tacit understanding are developed." 4' And
rather than striving for "more explicit and self-conscious . . .
connection[s] between the fixing of ends and the determination of
means," actors in minimally formalized flexible organizations are
habituated, instinctive, and unreflective.4 2
Sabel then proceeded to use the new firm as a template to revise
Hayek's model of political governance from already existing facts. In
other words, Sabel did not frame his overarching challenge to Hayek as
simply theoretical or conceptual but rather as grounded in the empirical
innovations of new economic organizations. Just as the new firm
transcends the limits of informal economic organization not by
reissuing clumsy commands but by designing explicit reason-giving
processes, public authorities need neither promulgate only "simple rules
for a complex world"43 (as Hayek would have it) nor write laws so
complex that they defy their own implementation. Instead, government
can redesign lawmaking as a discursive yet decentralized process
analogous to the practical reasoning developed in new flexible firms."
With legislative authorization and supervision, local actors can declare
their intent to solve a particular problem, formulate their ends in
consultation with affected others, and begin to fix their means.45 At
every moment, they can announce reasons for the means they choose,
explain these reasons to themselves and their peers, and propose
measures by which those peers should judge their reasons and results."
"Thus the actors become practical lawmakers," Sabel explained,
"accountable to each other for their choices."4 7 New governance can
achieve all this, he argued, because like the new firms, it enables
"actors to make explicit, through deliberate, joint re-evaluation . . . the
ends and means they set themselves.""
Sabel's faith in the example of the flexible firm thus allowed him
to start, like Hayek, with a set of insights about the limits of individual
knowledge and the failures of state planning, but to reach a very
different set of normative prescriptions. Hayek proposed to work within
the limits of individual knowledge that he identified. In his political
schema, abstract rules tell us only what not to do because "our intellect
41. Id. at 123.
42. Id. at 124.
43. See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD
(1995).
44. Sabel, Design, Deliberadon, and Democracy, supra note 6, at 132.
45. Id. at 139-41.
46. Id. at 140.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 120.
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is not capable of grasping reality in all its complexity." 49 Conversely,
Sabel proposed to intervene and incrementally transcend individual
epistemic constraints. As a result, he envisioned a system of
governance in which actors could redesign the rules coordinating
human activity through decentralized flexible processes-provided,
however, that these actors submit to specific discursive rules and
reason-giving procedures. Thus, rather than the minimalist state that
Hayek envisioned, the new governance state that Sabel promoted would
seek actively to formalize and regulate not substantive outcomes but
dialogic processes.
In the Part that follows, I suggest that Hayek and Sabel's divergent
visions of political governance clearly reflect their divergent
understandings of human capabilities to self-manage the limits of
knowledge. They also reflect their differing willingness to analogize
from the example of economic organizations to governance itself.
II. SELFHOOD AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION
As we have seen, Sabel used the empirical example of the firm to
refute Hayek's argument that individuals are limited in their capacities
to organize themselves through explicit and jointly reasoned
deliberation. "The objection to the Hayekian project," Sabel explained,
is that we do not find "Hayekian rules of good conduct at their alleged
source: in transactions within and among firms."o "[I]terated goal
setting," he claimed, "contravenes . . . Hayekian expectations." 51 "The
pooling of information and joint articulation of understandings," he
continued, "have nothing to do with either the nearly wordless
collaboration of the simplest . . . forms of Hayekian flexibility, nor
with the anecdotal connection among stores of knowledge in its more
complex variants. "52
But, as we have also seen, Sabel argued that the firm could
catalyze a "radical reimagining" of what political governance entailed
and how it should function." Sabel justified this shift from the
economic to the political and the small to large scale on the following
grounds. First, he suggested that, in the hands of Hayek's followers,
Hayek's theories of political governance became (at least implicitly) a
49. HAYEK, 1 LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY, supra note 13, at 32; see also
HAYEK, NEW STUDIES, supra note 22, at 7-8.
50. Sabel, Design, Deliberation, and Democracy, supra note 6, at 138.
51. Id. at 121.
52. Id. at 123.
53. Id. at 103-04 ("It is precisely [the] distinction between tacit action and
formal, ultimately political rule, I will argue, that is overturned by the central
innovation of the new organizations .. . .").
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set of theories about the management of small-scale economic
institutions. To that end, he described the work of economists and other
scholars who extended Hayekian principles to analyze and organize
firms and other forms of small-scale economic activity.5 4 "Just as
[Hayekians] are at pains," Sabel explained, "to create a state that
registers practice through incremental adjudication rather than
regulating it by legislation, so they are at pains to channel economic
activity not by formalizing it but rather by organizing informally.""
Sabel then offered a parallel response. Because, he argued, "[ildeas of
economic flexibility are . . . closely tied in the canonical views to ideas
of the state and representative democracy . . . [i]nadequacies of
understanding in the one realm suggest inadequacies in the other," and,
by extension, possibilities in one realm suggest possibilities in the
other." Hence, Sabel proposed that the new flexible firm suggested
analogous possibilities for new maximally formalized yet flexible
structures of political governance.
Fair enough as a general and, as it has turned out, extremely
generative claim. But we can nonetheless question whether, for Hayek,
the empirical description of the new firm can accomplish similar
analytical work. An overarching theme in Hayek's own writings is
minding a gap between two types of settings. The first are settings
where individuals can rely on deliberative reason to guide their
actions-for example, settings where individuals are familiar with
others and their circumstances and thus are assisted by their "positive
knowledge of cause and effect."" The second are settings where Hayek
suspects deliberative reason is far less dependable-namely, what he
calls the "great" or "abstract" or "open" society inclusive of us all. In
this Part, I suggest that even if the new flexible firm provides evidence
that organizational innovations can stretch an individual's capacity for
deliberation, where Sabel sees possibilities, Hayek would surely see
limitations of reason to navigate what for Sabel and Hayek is sharply
contested terrain: not (or not only) the individual's capacity to use
54. See id. at 111-20.
55. Id. at 118. He wrote further:
Just as the state must defer, through democracy, to the superiority of local,
practical knowledge as against the theoretical knowledge of the elites in
legislative chambers, so individuals and groups must defer to the deep
forms of sociability or conviviality out of which cognition grows, never
concluding that the ability to do something accords the right to say in detail
how it should be done.
Id. at 116.
56. Id. at 131.
57. HAYEK, NEW STUDIES, supra note 22, at 8.
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reason to manage problems, but the individual's capacity to use reason
as one's social contexts expand.
As I have argued in detail elsewhere, new governance envisions an
individual with considerable capacity for deliberate self-direction-
someone who is endowed with progressively expansive capabilities to
transcend her own epistemic constraints through ongoing, incremental,
and iterative reasoning and means-ends calculations." This person is
not someone who is (or can be) fully transparent to her self. Rather,
she is someone who can learn purposively to incorporate the limits of
her knowledge into her comparative deliberations and decisions, to see
how her choices reflect contingent and uncertain rather than stable or
objective realities, and, ultimately, to use this self-understanding to
manage her choices for problem-solving ends." Thus, for example,
Dorf and Sabel argue that "'self'-interest assumes as the starting point
for subsequent calculations the surprises of practical deliberation that
formerly confounded it. "'
Hayek, however, begins with a (quite extensive) set of
presumptions about selfhood that limit the individual's possibilities for
self-transcendence." Because his account of the self is so unusual, it-is
worth examining his claims up close. Individuals, he argues, are
constrained by a presupposed set of mental ordering rules that allow
them to comprehend objects and events not through purposive
reasoning (at least not as a first-order phenomenon), but rather and only
through classifying, comparing, and linking them to experiences of
other objects and events. Thus, for example, Hayek claims that "what
we perceive can never be unique properties of individual objects but
always only properties which the objects have in common with other
objects. Perception is thus always an interpretation, the placing of
something into one or several classes of objects."
An individual's particular set of mental ordering rules-which
constrain and enable perception in this way-are not innate or inevitable
but rather produced through experience in both conscious and
prereflective form. Experience, however, is a tricky concept: because
experience makes perception possible, for Hayek, experience "does not
begin with sensations or perceptions, but necessarily precedes them.""
58. See Amy J. Cohen, Negotiation, Meet New Governance: Interests, Skills,
and Selves, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 503 (2008).
59. See id. at 522-29.
60. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 17, at 322.
61. See generally F.A. HAYEK, THE SENSORY ORDER: AN INQUIRY INTO THE
FOUNDATIONS OF THEORETICAL PSYCHOLOGY (1952) [hereinafter HAYEK, THE SENSORY
ORDER].
62. Id. at 142.
63. Id. at 166.
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If each sensation, he explains, is "an interpretation of an event in the
light of the past experience of the individual or the species,"' then
"experience is not a function of mind or consciousness, but . . . mind
and consciousness are rather products of experience."" In other words,
Hayek argues that all we know about the external world is produced
through experience-cum-mental-ordering-rules, which, in turn, enable
us to link objects and events to past experiences.'
But although Hayek supposes that all knowledge is experiential, he
does not suppose that knowledge is either stable or necessarily correct.
"[W]e are not entitled to assume," he argues, "that the world appears
to us as it does because it is like that."" To the contrary, "[i]t requires
a deliberate effort to divest oneself of the habitual assumption that all
we have learned from experience must be true."" Indeed, it is precisely
because mental ordering rules are the result of experience that
individuals can and should revise them in light of new experiences."
But this possibility for deliberate revision requires higher order mental
rules that, although themselves a product of experience, cannot be
recognized or communicated. As Hayek explains,
there will always be some rules governing a mind which that
mind in its then prevailing state cannot communicate, and
that, if it ever were to acquire the capacity of communicating
these rules, this would presuppose that it had acquired further
higher rules which make the communication of the former
possible but which themselves will still be incommunicable."
Nor can these higher order meta-rules "be the outcome of a
conscious process, not something at which the mind can deliberately
64. Id.
65. Id. He writes further that "[wihenever we study qualitative differences
between experiences we are studying mental and not physical events, and much that we
believe to know about the external world is, in fact, knowledge about ourselves." Id. at
6-7.
66. Id. at 143. Indeed, Hayek claims that "[an event of an entirely new kind
which has never occurred before, and which sets up impulses which arrive in the brain
for the first time, could not be perceived at all." Id. at 142.
67. Id. at 6.
68. Id. at 168 (emphasis added).
69. Id. at 145, 168-69.
70. F.A. Hayek, "Meta-Conscious" Rules and the Explanation of Mind, in
ORDER-WITH OR WITHOUT DESIGN?: SELECTIONS FROM F.A. HAYEK'S CONTRBUTION
TO THE THEORY AND APPLICATION OF SPONTANEOUS ORDER 65 (Naomi Moldofsky ed.,
1989).
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aim, but always a discovery of something which already guides its
operation."
Put differently, Hayek claims that we cannot consciously create or
even know the abstract rules that produce the conditions for conscious
deliberation with our selves or others.72 Consciousness allows us access
only to the particular effects of the rules that guide our mental
activities-the concrete things we feel and think.73 Although these
effects "appear to us as the absolute and irreducible data of
consciousness," 74 for Hayek, any unitary deliberative self is only an
appearance-a cover for a series of cognitive relations and
classifications that are guided by "a supra-conscious" system that
operates above and upon our conscious thoughts.75
For Hayek, two claims follow from this argument that the
individual is and must remain unaware of the abstract rules that govern
her conscious thoughts. The first claim is that our thinking rests on
more than we can consciously express and more than we can derive
from known connections between means and ends." Our traits, talents,
and actions reflect prior (and unknown) cognitive and social ordering
77rules as much as individual characteristics and deliberate calculations.
The second claim is the flip side of the first. As we respond to the
effects of our mental orders (i.e., what we think and feel) and to the
71. HAYEK, NEW STUDIES, supra note 22, at 46; see also HAYEK, THE
SENSORY ORDER, supra note 61, at 169-70 ("There is, therefore, on every level, or in
every universe of discourse, a part of our knowledge which, although it is the result of
experience, cannot be controlled by experience, because it constitutes the ordering
principle of that universe by which we distinguish the different kinds of objects of
which it consists and to which our statements refer.").
72. For an excellent discussion of this point on which this discussion draws,
see Gary T. Dempsy, Hayek's Terra Incognita of the Mind, 34 S. J. PHIL. 13, 22-27
(1996).
73. Id. at 26.
74. HAYEK, THE SENSORY ORDER, supra note 61, at 142.
75. Hayek, "Meta-Conscious" Rules, supra note 70, at 63; see also Dempsy,
supra note 72, at 26. Take note of Hayek's quite self-conscious rejection of the
Freudian metaphor: "It is generally taken for granted," he explains, "that in some sense
conscious experience constitutes the 'highest' level in the hierarchy of mental events,
and that what is not conscious has remained 'sub-conscious' because it has not yet risen
to that level." HAYEK, NEW STODIES, supra note 22, at 45. Hayek, however, does not
describe a subconscious but "a supra-conscious mechanism," which, he argues, should
supplant erroneous descriptions of "conscious thought and explicit statements as in
some sense the highest level of mental functions." Hayek, "Meta-Conscious" Rules,
supra note 70, at 63. For Hayek's criticisms of Freud (and specifically the idea of
freedom from repression), see HAYEK, 3 LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY, supra note
15, at 174-76.
76. See, e.g., Hayek, "Meta-Conscious" Rules, supra note 70, at 63; HAYEK,
1 LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY, supra note 13, at 11-12.
77. HAYEK, 1 LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY, supra note 13, at 17-19.
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symbols and codes of our social orders (i.e., prices, moral esteem,
social shame), we are constrained in our ability to deliberately control
our mind's activity.7 ' To suggest otherwise would envision, as Gary
Dempsy writes, "the presence of a free-floating consciousness that is
independent of the precursory workings of our 'linking' mind."" For
Hayek, however, there is no such self-directing, self-articulated
overseer of consciousness. To the contrary, Hayek argues that there are
costs to imagining otherwise and striving, as far as possible, to make
our mental processes explicit." Our mental ordering rules allow us to
move through a world that is imperfectly known-stretching the "the
scope of phenomena which we can master intellectually," by enabling
us broadly to interpret, classify, and ascribe meaning to objects through
linkages to past experiences." The more we try to master the
particulars, shape events according to our wills, or pursue agreement
on specific ends, the narrower the scope of the social order we can
induce to form or hope to comprehend.82 Thus Hayek concludes that an
individual's capacity for purposive reason and rational means-ends
calculations works best in defined and limited social contexts 83Beyond
these contexts, the individual "stumbles," relying on largely tacit or
unarticulated structures beyond her conscious awareness, such as the
conventions of her communities or the experiences of others.8
Hayek's theory of the organization, while not nearly as elaborate,
is strikingly analogous to his theory of the individual. When individuals
combine to pursue shared ends, he argues that the organization that
results remains "one 'person' among others, " with a system of means
and ends that is intelligible within its own "separate and limited
sphere."" The organization, like the individual, must therefore mediate
78. See, e.g., id. at 30.
79. Dempsy, supra note 72, at 23.
80. See, e.g., HAYEK, 1 LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY, supra note 13, at
29-31. For a similar (and quite extensive) argument about the costs of formalizing tacit
knowledge, see generally MICHAEL POLANYI, THE TACIT DIMENSION (Peter Smith ed.,
1983).
81. HAYEK, 1 LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY, supra note 13, at 32.
82. See, e.g., id. at 29, 33, 41.
83. See, e.g., FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER 14
(1948). Indeed, as Ernst-Joachim Mestmiicker explains, "in Hayek's theory, rational
choice is limited to the micro level." ERNST-JOACHIM MESTMACKER, A LEGAL THEORY
WITHOUT LAW: POSNER v. HAYEK ON ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 34 (2007)
(suggesting that "the hostility of Austrian economics to efficiency as a guide to public
policy" has its roots in Hayek's theories).
84. See F.A. HAYEK, THE FATAL CONCEIT: THE ERRORS OF SOCIALISM 14
(1988); HAYEK, 1 LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY, supra note 13, at 17-18, 30-31.
85. FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 60 (1944).
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its capacities for deliberate and extra-deliberate or tacit ordering.' The
"family, the farm, the plant, the firm, the corporation and the various
associations, and all the public institutions including government,"
Hayek explains, achieve their ends through a combination of specific
purposive commands that govern means-ends calculations within a
limited sphere and through abstract rules that enable the flow of tacit
knowledge within and beyond that sphere." Consider the following
passage:
[T]he general rules of law that a spontaneous order rests on aim at
an abstract order . . . while the commands as well as the rules
which govern an organization serve particular results aimed at by
those who are in command of the organization."
Indeed, Hayek explains that unlike the abstract rules of society, the
rules of organization-although still sufficiently general to enable
learning and cooperation-serve the purposes established by the
organization and are interpreted in light of those purposes.89 But
[tihe more complex the order aimed at, the greater will be
that part of the separate actions which will have to be
determined by circumstances not known to those who direct
the whole, and the more dependent control will be on rules
rather than on specific commands. In the most complex types
of organizations, indeed, little more than the assignment of
particular functions and the general aim will be determined by
command of the supreme authority, while the performance of
these functions will be regulated only by rules-yet by rules
which at least to some degree are specific to the functions
assigned to particular persons.'
As organizations increase in complexity, Hayek thus anticipates that
they will rely less on commands and more on general yet still purposive
rules. But between the most complex organization and society there is a
qualitative shift:
86. HAYEK, 1 LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY, supra note 13, at 46 ("In any
group of men of more than the smallest size, collaboration will always rest both on
spontaneous order as well as on deliberate organization.").
87. Id. at 46-50.
88. Id. at 50 (emphasis added).
89. See, e.g., id. at 49 ("Rules of organization are . . . necessarily subsidiary
to commands, filling in the gaps left by the commands.").
90. Id. at 50.
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Only when we pass from the biggest kind of organization,
government, which as organization must still be dedicated to a
circumscribed and determined set of specific purposes, to the
overall order of the whole of society, do we find an order
which relies solely on rules and is entirely spontaneous in
c1aracter.91
Hayek's description of the organization thus does not insist on
spontaneous, wordless, or habituated cooperation all the way down. He
instead tries to envision how to shift from small-scale organizations to
the overall order of society by shifting from purposive rules that enable
individuals deliberately to pursue particular means and ends in
circumscribed contexts to rules that are independent of any particular
ends at all. But neither does Hayek envision an ever-expanding,
mutually reinforcing, and radically democratic setting of means and
ends by self-articulated actors. That is Sabel's description of the firm,
which rests on a different set of assumptions about individual capacities
and part/whole relations.
Sabel argues that organizations can induce within individuals the
ability continuously to expand their capacities for explicit and
comparative means-ends calculations. As individuals articulate and
readjust these calculations through discursive interactions, they reorient
their goals, their strategies, and even their identities.' This capacity for
purposive reinvention enabled by the organization in turn has reciprocal
effects on the organization and society as a whole. Just as the new
firm's federated work teams redesign the product as they redesign the
product's parts, individuals can aspire to a "second-order application"
of learning-by-monitoring principles. In Sabel's words: "j]ust as the
actors are learning to co-design products, they have to learn how to co-
design the institutions that make this first-order cooperation more
robust."" And more still: just as individual actors learn to redesign
organizations, organizations can aspire to redesign the relations among
91. Id. (emphasis added).
92. See, e.g., C.F. Sabel, Beyond Principal-Agent Governance:
Experimentalist Organizations, Learning, and Accountability, in DE STAAT VAN DE
DEMOCRATIE: DEMOCRATIE VOORBlJ DE STAAT 173, 191 (E.R. Engelen & M. Sie Dhian
Ho eds., 2004). See also Sabel, Learning by Monitoring, supra note 32, at 138
("[I]nstitutions transform transactions into discussions, for discussion is precisely the
process by which parties come to reinterpret themselves and their relation to each other
by elaborating a common understanding of the world.").
93. Charles F. Sabel, Pragmatic Collaborations in Practice: A Response to
Herrigel and Whitford and Zeitlin, 11 INDUS. & INNOVATION 81, 82 (2004).
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themselves, the "public sphere that includes them all," and "the self
rule of the polity." 94
Thus I am suggesting that between Hayek and Sabel is a qualitative
and conceptual-not empirical-divide. For Hayek, the new firm is
only ever an organization that, like an individual, will eventually face
the limits of its deliberate cognition and is incommensurate with society
as a whole. For Sabel, the new firm represents what, across hybrid
levels of scale, society could be.
III. BOTTOM-UP LAWMAKING
By arguing that the new firm cannot accomplish for Hayek what it
does for Sabel, I have foregrounded divergent assumptions about
individual reason and social organization that leads the two thinkers to
promote, from a similar starting point, quite different visions of social
and political governance. In this Part, I suggest that distinguishing
Sabel-inspired new governance from Hayek-inspired neoliberalism
along these same axes of selfhood and organization helps to elucidate
their divergent approaches to bottom-up lawmaking, even as both seek
to limit top-down legislation. For Sabel, the overarching problem with
welfare-state style legislation and adjudication is that they fail to
achieve their own ends-namely, to ensure democratic accountability
and rights under conditions of complex and rapid technological,
economic, and social change. Our existing structures of enacting and
enforcing legal rules, he argues, cannot simultaneously stay apace with
shifting social circumstances and stay faithful to the directives set by
sovereign authorities.95 Sabel thus endorses Hayek's praxis of flexible
coordination but, as we have seen, aims to formalize it by adding a
"duty to articulate" incumbent upon local problem-solvers and decision-
making units.96 In this way, Sabel claims, individuals and groups can
"become practical lawmakers, accountable to each other for their
choices" about the variable regulation of social life.' For Hayek,
however, the irremediable problem with welfarist legislation is that it
depends upon erroneous assumptions about individual reason and social
organization-assumptions that Sabel seeks to radicalize and reconstruct
rather than upend.
94. Sabel & Simon, supra note 27, at 402-03 (explaining that reconceiving the
relations among these entities raises unanswered questions, but questions that suggest
that new governance requires a rethinking of democracy).
95. Sabel, Design, Deliberation, and Democracy, supra note 6, at 104, 135-
37; see also Sabel & Simon, supra note 27, at 398-400.
96. I borrow this phrase from Simon, supra note 34, at 48.
97. Sabel, Design, Deliberation, and Democracy, supra note 6, at 140.
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Throughout writings that spanned nearly the entire Cold War,
Hayek aimed to refute ideas that he associated with "social"
conceptions of law." Again, it is worth pausing to make sense of his
ideas. According to Hayek, the term "social" had morphed from a
word descriptive of human processes to a term of "moral approbation"
with a specific normative end." "[Social] gradually came to mean," he
wrote, "that 'society' ought to hold itself responsible for the particular
material position of all its members . . . [and] that the processes of
society should be deliberately directed to particular results."" Against
this vision, he relentlessly contested the idea that "social" ends are
qualitatively distinct from the identical ends of many individuals,101 as
well as the corresponding idea that the "distinctive" interests of social
groups could justify the coercion of other individuals in their pursuit.102
He also rejected the underlying methodological premise that planners-
but more accurately that anyone'os-could advance (putatively) social
ends in deliberate or predictable ways by applying purposive and
context-specific techniques.tH He repeatedly argued that "socialists"
erroneously prefer "everything that is done 'consciously' or
'deliberately,"' and therefore vastly undervalue the irrational (or non-
rational) and haphazard interactions of individuals to organize the actual
possibilities of collective human life.
98. Hayek's famous writings against socialism began in 1944 with The Road
to Serfdom and ended in 1988 (near the end of his life) with The Fatal Conceit: The
Errors of Socialism.
99. See HAYEK, 2 LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY, supra note 24, at 78-79.
He argues that the term social "came increasingly to displace such terms as 'ethical' or
simply 'good'"-it "became more and more the description of the pre-eminent virtue,
the attribute in which the good man excelled and the ideal by which communal action
was to be guided." Id. at 79.
100. Id.
101. HAYEK, ROAD TO SERFDOM, supra note 85, at 60.
102. See id. at 85-87.
103. As Andrew Gamble explains, for Hayek, "[tihere were 'constitutional,'
not just empirical, limits to human knowledge," which humans could not overcome
"through getting more of it. Knowledge was limited because the human mind was
limited." Andrew Gamble, Hayek on Knowledge, Economics, and Society, in THE
CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO HAYEK 111, 117 (Edward Feser ed., 2006). See also supra
notes 61-84 and accompanying text.
104. See HAYEK, 1 LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY, supra note 13, at 56-59.
105. Id. at 11. Indeed, Hayek repeatedly argued that the crucial difference
between (classical) liberals and socialists was not normative but logical. See, e.g.,
HAYEK, 2 LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY, supra note 24, at 136 ("Socialism is not
based merely on a different system of ultimate values from that of liberalism, which
one would have to respect even if one disagreed; it is based on an intellectual error
which makes its adherents blind to its consequences.").
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But because Hayek argued that social reformers overvalue reason
and the powers of the deliberate will, he did not counter left-liberal (or,
for him, socialist) legalism by reviving individualist doctrines of
classical legal thought and will theory. Indeed, not only did he reject
the socialist's idea of law as an instrument to advance desirable social
ends, he also rejected the classical liberal's idea of law as a set of
positive explicit "premises from which the whole system of rules of just
conduct could be logically deduced,"" and which sees "individual man
as the starting point and supposed him to form societies by the union of
his particular will with another in a formal contract.""
In place of both visions, Hayek offered a distinctively cultural
theory of law."os He argued that abstract rules of social cooperation are
known not through the announcement of their deliberate creation-
either through deduction from prior premises or through scientific
efforts to engineer particular results.'" Rather, they are known through
the social fact of being already observed."o "Law in the sense of
enforced rules of conduct," Hayek claimed, "is undoubtedly coeval
with society . . . there can be no doubt that law existed for ages before
it occurred to man that he could make or alter it.""' Rules of just
conduct (i.e., private and criminal law) are produced through a
collective and experiential winnowing and sifting of social practice,
values, and conventions-selected because they enable the societies that
adopt them to prevail over others, and often made effective through
unorganized social pressure rather than explicit sanctions." 2
New governance (which emerged after the end of the Cold War as
an alternative to deregulation and privatization as much as to socialist
planning) shares Hayek's emphasis on lawmaking as emergent from
106. HAYEK, 2 LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY, supra note 24, at 44.
107. HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER, supra note 83, at 10
(internal citation omitted).
108. On Hayek's theories of "cultural evolution," see generally HAYEK, 3
LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY, supra note 15, at 155-58. For an exploration of the
Hayekian roots of the contemporary emphasis on norm generation and informal
ordering in legal scholarship, see David Charny, Illusions of a Spontaneous Order:
"Norms" in Contractual Relationshinps, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1841 (1996).
109. See, e.g., HAYEK, 1 LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY, supra note 13, at
21.
110. Id. at 95.
111. Id. at 72-73. For a similar argument, see Rodolfo Sacco, Mute Law, 43
AM. J. COMP. L. 455, 456 (1995) ("The point is that 'the Lawgiver' is a recent entry
into the domain of Law and that law may live, and lived, even without a lawgiver.").
See also LA DIMENSIONE TACITA DEL DIRTro [THE TACIT DIMENSION OF LAW]
(Raffaela Caterina ed., 2009).
112. See HAYEK, NEW STUDIES, supra note 22, at 6-7; see also HAYEK, 1 LAW,
LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY, supra note 13, at 43, 99; HAYEK, 2 LAW, LEGISLATION AND
LIBERTY, supra note 24, at 34.
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social practice rather than through abstract deduction or sovereign will.
As Grdinne de Bfirca explains, new governance is "radically bottom-up
in seeing social actors/stakeholders as generative of norms, and
responsible for the spread and dispersal of these through their ongoing
practices and activities.""' Or as Anne-Marie Slaughter suggests, new
forms of horizontal democratic governance "rest[] on the empirical fact
of mushrooming private governance regimes in which individuals,
groups, and corporate entities . . . generate the rules, norms, and
principles they are prepared to live by." 14 Both these scholars describe
the empirical expansion, along with the value, of governance regimes
that empower individuals and regulated entities to formulate, elaborate,
and/or enforce their own rules.
But, following Sabel, new governance proponents do not adopt
Hayek's understanding of tacit or "grown" law. For Hayek, actors
make evolved rules of conduct explicit only at certain moments (for
example, when it is necessary to resolve "differences of opinion about
appropriate behavior")."' And only rarely does Hayek think
governments should make explicit laws (for example, when rules of
conduct evolve unjustly "deliberate legislation may . . . be the only
practicable way out"" 6 ). By contrast, new governance envisions
bottom-up lawmaking not only as diffuse, decentralized, and emergent
from practice but also as self-reflexive, transparent, and dialogically
reasoned. De Bilrca, for example, describes a (new governance-esque)
European Union directive that requires Member States to combat
workplace (and other forms) of discrimination by promoting "social
dialogue" to achieve "the monitoring of workplace practices, collective
agreements, codes of conduct, research or exchange of experiences and
good practices."" And Joanne Scott and Susan Sturm explain more
113. Grdinne de Bdrca, EU Race Discrimination Law: A Hybrid Model?, in
LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US 97, 98 (Grdinne de Bdrca &
Joanne Scott eds., 2006) (comparing new governance with a human rights perspective).
114. ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 194 (2004).
115. See, e.g., HAYEK, 1 LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY, supra note 13, at
43, 78. Consider, for example, Hayek's reproach of those who hold that "with the
recognition of the principles of private property and freedom of contract . . . all the
issues were settled, as if the law of property and contracts were given once and for all
in its final and most appropriate form, i.e., in the form which will make the market
economy work at its best." FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND EcONOMIC
ORDER 111 (1948), quoted in Fritz Machlup, Hayek's Contribution to Economics, in
ESSAYS ON HAYEK 13, 38 (Fritz Machlup ed., 2003).
116. HAYEK, 1 LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY, supra note 13, at 88-89
(explaining that "the most frequent cause is probably that the development of the law
has lain in the hands of members of a particular class whose traditional views made
them regard as just what could not meet the more general requirements of justice").
117. de B~irca, supra note 113, at 101 (quoting the directive, art. 11) (emphasis
added).
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generally that new governance "locates responsibility for law-making in
deliberative processes which are to be continually revised by
participants in light of experience, and provides for accountability
through transparency and peer review.""' Indeed, as Sabel initially
argued by analogy to the dialogic practices of the firm, making
behavioral regularities explicit is not a post hoc correction to extant law
but rather is the very condition for making social practice into law.
Moreover, whereas Hayek claimed that law should evolve from
practice to delineate only general rules of conduct applicable to us
all,119 Sabel did not propose that bottom-up lawmakers should
themselves resist the pursuit of particular social objectives. His proviso,
instead, is that individuals must use explicit reason to justify them. As
he explained with Joshua Cohen, "[c]itizens contemplating the exercise
of collective power owe one another reasons, and owe attention to one
another's reasons." 20 And whereas Hayek's theories of law rest on his
overarching understanding of society comprised of only individuals
(and of organizations that act analogously to individuals), new
governance, as Simon explains, takes "collective action as
paradigmatic." 21 In other words, overarching ideas about individual
reason and collective behavior-which, for Hayek, inform conceptions
of law so erroneous he laments that they share the same namel22
appear in new governance transformed in method, actor, and scale but
nonetheless intact.
118. Joanne Scott & Susan Sturm, Courts as Catalysts: Re-Thinking the
Judicial Role in New Governance, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 565, 566 (2007). I should add:
although new governance scholars widely share this emphasis on dialogue and
deliberation, their conceptions of the role of law and lawmaking in new governance are
also varied and contested. For careful, detailed accounts, see Grdinne de Bdrca &
Joanne Scott, Introduction: New Governance, Law and Constitutionalism, in LAW AND
NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US I (Grdinne de Bdrca & Joanne Scott eds.,
2006); David M. Trubek & Louise G. Trubek, New Governance & Legal Regulation:
Complementarity, Rivalry, and Transformation, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 539 (2007); Neil
Walker & Grdinne de Bf6rca, Reconceiving Law & New Governance, 13 COLUM. J.
EUR. L. 519 (2007).
119. See, e.g., HAYEK, NEW STUDIES, supra note 22, at 80 (arguing against
"the increasing replacement of rules of just individual conduct . . . by conceptions of
'social' or 'distributive' justice").
120. Joshua Cohen & Charles Sabel, Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy, 3 EUR.
L.J. 313, 327 (1997).
121. Simon, supra note 34, at 64.
122. See HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM, supra note 85, at 83 n.3 (describing
a "conflict . .. between different kinds of law-law so different that it should hardly be
called by the same name"); see also HAYEK, 1 LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY, supra
note 13, at 62 ("'[Llaw' no longer [has] a clear meaning."); id. at 132 ("During the
last hundred years it has been chiefly in the service of so-called 'social' aims that the
distinction between rules of just conduct and rules for the organization of the services
of government has been progressively obliterated.").
Hayek and Sabel
The comparison thus far makes clear that we can understand new
governance as a familiar kind of liberal legalism-that is, as a
"demand," to borrow from Duncan Kennedy, "for ethical rationality in
the world."1 23 After decades of left and right disenchantment with law,
new governance resuscitates the claims that law can embody reason,
and that through law-or, more accurately, through ordinary people as
practical lawmakers-we can regulate the affirmative ways we live
together and the affirmative obligations the state assumes for our well-
being.124
Legalism, however, is not the feature of new governance made
salient in most contemporary accounts, which analyze it as a break
from liberal law. Analysts, for example, describe new governance as an
"undermining of law," 1 25  a "move away from law-centered
strategies,"I26 and "informality, soft law, and extra-legal forms in
action."1 27 But when read against Hayekian neoliberalism, new
governance emerges as a formalizing, reason-seeking, indeed law-
seeking project; that is, as a deliberate (but democratic) effort to try
one's "absolute best to decide what principles govern and then apply
them." 128
This Article ventures one final comparison. In the concluding Part
that follows, I consider whether emphasizing new governance's
continuities with liberal legalism, rather than the breaks between them,
helps explain why new governance "brackets," whereas Hayek
categorically rejects, social distribution as a first-order goal of law and
legal policy. As we shall see, for Hayek, social justice is not a matter to
123. Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850-
2000, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 19, 72
(David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006).
124. In the new governance paradigm, professional judges and legislators
engage in meta-analysis: they use reason not to reach right outcomes but to induce and
evaluate the deliberations of others. For example, they may ensure rights of
participation; grant remedies for exclusion; issue mandates or incentivize local actors to
produce information, justify their decisions, and proffer comparative standards of
evaluation; and award penalties for the failure to so engage. See, e.g., Sabel, Design,
Deliberation, and Democracy, supra note 6, at 145; see also Dorf & Sabel, supra note
17, at 396-98; Scott & Sturm, supra note 118.
125. Solomon, supra note 10, at 827 (suggesting that for Sabel and Simon
"[n]ew forms of governance are emerging because of the limits of law, and further
undermining of law ought to be embraced").
126. NeJaime, supra note 3, at 351.
127. Alexander, supra note 2, at 175 n.351. But see Orly Lobel, The Paradox
of ExtraLegal Activism: Critical Legal Consciousness and Transformative Politics, 120
HARV. L. REv. 937, 983 (2007) (refusing a description of new governance as extralegal
activism).
128. Duncan Kennedy, A Semiotics of Citique, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 1147,
1159 (2001) (describing legalism).
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suspend in order to facilitate bottom-up innovation, but belongs "to the
category of . . . nonsense, like the term 'a moral stone."'
1 29
CONCLUSION: INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY, SOCIAL
ACCOUNTABILITY, AND QUESTIONS OF JUSTICE
Sabel, no less than Hayek, proposes to create governance
frameworks that are general and end-independent. That is, rather than
promote the kind of "centralist egalitarianism" (or any other particular
distributivist aim) that they associate with left-liberal or socialist ideals,
both thinkers argue that governance should aspire primarily to
maximize opportunities for individuals to learn, contribute to, and
benefit from decentralized social processes.130 But many new
governance proponents nonetheless find the suspension of distributive
ends normatively troubling. As Simon puts it:
a salient feature of [new governance] institutions that . . . I
think should trouble anybody [is] that they tend to bracket
distributive questions-that they tend to focus on the
possibility of collective gains, mutual gains, and hope that
those gains will be large enough so that it will be worth it to
people not to focus on the distributive issues."'
Some new governance proponents condone the shelving of
distributive claims at the micro level (to stimulate collaboration) but
reject its implications on a larger scale. Orly Lobel, for example,
describes Sabel and Dorf's "strong collapse between means and ends
[as] a perilous step," and argues that new governance scholars should
defend basic "[s]ubstantive criteria of the common good" even as they
propose to catalyze collaborative and stakeholder-driven negotiations.' 32
Others challenge the point in stronger terms. For example, whereas
Sabel speaks of promoting experiments before experiments,' 33 Susan
Sturm argues for a nearly opposite set of priors: if new governance
129. HAYEK, 2 LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY, supra note 24, at 78; see also
HAYEK, 1 LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY, supra note 13, at 121 (defining social
justice as the "aiming at particular results for particular persons or groups").
130. See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 17, at 408.
131. Handier et al., supra note 3, at 506 (William Simon's remarks) (emphasis
added).
132. Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of
Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REv. 342, 468-69, 396
(2004).
133. Sabel, Design, Deliberation, and Democracy, supra note 6, at 125
(describing how new flexible organizations cannot assume prior knowledge of even
their design choices).
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aspires to "far-reaching social equity" (she poses the matter as a
question), then perhaps "equality is necessary for new governance to
work in the first place." 1 34 Some skirt the point entirely. Lani Guinier,
for example, describes new governance as an effort to connect
participatory democracy with social justice.13 1
Within the new governance enterprise, then, there is a toggle of
views-at times, questions of ex ante distribution are fully bracketed; at
others, they are made a condition of participatory deliberation. Sabel
tends towards the first side of this distinction and various participants
range themselves out along it in multiple ways. But given the
differences between Sabel and Hayek outlined above, it remains to
explain why Sabel (and various collaborators) provisionally decline to
endorse direct efforts to remedy social inequalities through law. The
answer that several scholars propose is distinctly Hayekian. If planners
cannot know what bits of dispersed and contingent knowledge
decentralized collaborative and competitive processes will enable
individuals to discover and use, planners who direct these processes or
"pick winners" risk undermining their innovative potential.136 Indeed,
new governance plainly shares Hayek's unwillingness to derive the
utility of means from predefined ends,137 as well as Hayek's description
of cooperation, competition, and experimentation as "first and foremost
134. Susan Sturm, Gender Equity Regimes and the Architecture of Learning, in
LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US 323, 331 (Grdinne de B-drca &
Joanne Scott eds., 2006); see also Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers, Power and Reason, in
DEEPENING DEMOCRACY: INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATIONS IN EMPOWERED PARTICIPATORY
GOVERNANCE 237, 251-53 (Archon Fung & Erik Olin Wright eds., 2003) (proposing
that under particular conditions "gaining the benefits of deliberation may well require
direct efforts to address inequalities of power").
135. Lani Guinier, Supreme Democracy: Bush v. Gore Redux, 34 LoY. U.
CHI. L.J. 23, 67-68 (2002) (describing work by Dorf and Sabel and others); ct
NeJaime, supra note 3, at 327 ("I hope to position New Governance as a contingent
model of cause lawyering that complements, rather than replaces, other (and
specifically litigation-focused) models.") (emphasis added).
136. For example, Simon explains that rather than advocate for the direct
transfer of resources to weaker groups, new governance tends to emphasize the
indeterminacy and the frequent impossibility of assessing the risks and benefits of
deliberation in advance. Simon, supra note 10, at 207-08. Dorf and Sabel caution that
even if redistribution can produce sustained social change, decentralized experimentalist
deliberation is the most effective means to determine how to apply (and perhaps even
distribute) resources. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 17, at 410-13. Illustrating the point,
Liebman and Sabel argue that, in the absence of experimental new governance means,
efforts to equalize school financing produced "no or disappointingly little educational
improvement." James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewey
Barely Imagined: The Emerging Model of School Governance and Legal Reform, 28
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 183, 204 (2003).
137. See, e.g., HAYEK, 2 LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY, supra note 24, at
18.
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a discovery procedure" that refuses to assume "that the facts to be
discovered are already known."' But Hayek's own rejection of a "just
distribution" of material/social goods (scare quotes his) is too closely
intertwined with his theories of reason and scale to map easily onto new
governance.139
Hayek uses the term "responsibility" to describe obligations that
individuals owe to themselves and others, and the term "justice" to
describe obligations that the state can legitimately enforce. And he
limits both concepts according to his (by now familiar) claim that
reason diminishes as social organization expands. For example, he
argues that although "reason in fact plays only a small part in
determining human action," individuals can use the discipline of
individual responsibility "to make that little go as far as possible" if
they can decipher within what limited contexts responsibility can likely
influence individual actions. " Hayek thus distinguishes responsibility,
like reason, according to shifts in levels of scale. Responsibility, he
argues, "forcefully directs" an individual's "attention to those
circumstances that he can control as if they were the only ones that
mattered."141 "To be effective," he continues, "responsibility must be
both definite and limited," applicable to problems and solutions
individuals can plausibly make their own, and thus properly "adapted to
the capacities of our mind[s]."l4 Social reformers risk eviscerating
responsibility entirely when they press upon the individual member of
society the kinds of collective obligations suited to the small group.14 3
Hence, the genesis of the contemporary neoliberal condition: relentless
138. HAYEK, 3 LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY, supra note 15, at 68.
139. Id. at 176.
140. HAYEK, CONSTITUTION, supra note 13, at 76-77. Hayek similarly rejects
the idea that individual responsibility is undercut by the limits of individual rationality
and self-direction. For example, he writes (in a sentence with a confusing double
negative): "[i]t is just because there is no separate 'self that stands outside the chain of
causation that there is also no 'self' that we could not reasonably try to influence"
through experience, education, approval, and/or shame. Id. at 74 (emphasis added).
141. Id. at 71.
142. Id. at 83-84. It is worth noting that, for Hayek, responsibility is "not a
statement of fact or an assertion about causation," but a means to make man's "actions
different from what they would be if he did not believe [responsibility] to be true," id.
at 74-75, and "a discipline that man must impose upon himself if he is to achieve his
aims." Id. at 72. Even if, he explains, there is no direct relation between self-
cultivation and achievement, perpetuating belief in individual responsibility is likely to
enhance human behavior, provided, however, that responsibility is properly restricted
and defined. Id. at 82-83.
143. Id. at 83-84.
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but circumscribed responsibility for one's self and no responsibility for
abstract others.'"
Hayek applies analogous logic to justice. Strikingly, he locates
justice first in the realm of the non-rational and tacit.'45 He explains that
his efforts to render intelligible what people mean when they speak of
justice led to his discovery of the "super-conscious" ordering principles
of the human mind.'" Yet, in many of his writings, he aspires to make
justice, like responsibility, limited and rational.4 7 Even if members of
small groups can assist their neighbors commensurate with their tacit
moral feelings, "the spatial range of 'social justice' is "wholly
different in the Great or Open Society."" In modem society, where the
division of labor extends the effects of individual conduct beyond what
any individual can foresee, justice can only rationally describe conduct
that individuals can control directly.' 49 Organizations, like individuals,
can act justly,' but society cannot.'' Spontaneous social orders can
produce bad effects, and markets, Hayek explains, always produce
winners and losers, but these disparate effects are never a question of
justice.'52 " W o," Hayek repeatedly asks, "has been unjust?" 53
144. See, e.g., WENDY BROWN, Neoliberaism and the End of Liberal
Democracy, in EDGEWORK: CRITICAL ESSAYS ON KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 37 (2005).
145. For example, Hayek explains that "if we speak of the 'sense of
justice,' . . . we refer to such rules which we are able to apply, but do not know
explicitly." HAYEK, NEW STUDIES, supra note 22, at 8.
146. Id. at 45-46.
147. Indeed, Hayek aspires to make justice objective and repeatedly rejects the
Kelsenian idea that "from the point of rational cognition there are only interests of
human beings and hence conflicts of interests," and the corresponding idea that justice
is "a balancing of particular interests at stake in a concrete case." HAYEK, 2 LAW,
LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY, supra note 24, at 53, 39 (internal quotation marks omitted).
148. Id. at 88; see also id. at 38-39.
149. Id. at 31-32, 90-91. For Hayek, individual conduct is just when it
conforms to an abstract rule of law. That rule of law, in turn, is just not because a
sovereign has deduced it from explicit premises but rather because she has tested its
potential for "universalization" against the "whole complex of rules which in fact are
observed in a given society." Id. at 51-54.
150. Id. at 32-33. For Hayek, "how far [the] duty [of the organization] in
justice extends must depend on its power to affect the position of the different
individuals in accordance with uniform rules." Id. at 33.
151. Id. at 67-73 (discussing "the inapplicability of the concept of justice to the
results of a spontaneous process").
152. For example, Hayek writes:
Justice requires that in the "treatment" of another person or persons, i.e., m
the intentional actions affecting the well-being of other persons, certain
uniform rules of conduct be observed. It clearly has no application to the
manner in which the impersonal process of the market allocates command
over goods and services to particular people; this can neither be just or
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Sabel does not speak in Hayek's terms of "responsibility" or of
"justice," but rather of institutional and structural accountability. 54 And
as these terms suggest, Sabel's description of accountability is not
individuated or moralizing, nor does it propose to predigest its own
limits. Rather accountability aims to "ratchet up" individual and
collective obligations by systemically and reciprocally linking, first, the
individual and the organization and, second, the organization and the
polity."' Through specific discursive rules and reason-giving
procedures, individuals make their means and ends accessible to others
affected by a shared problem: problem-solving organizations make their
choices and criteria open to public view, and public officials pool,
compare, and measure outcomes across organizations-expanding
through discursive networks the kinds of demands that members of the
polity can make upon others and the kinds of obligations they owe to
one another.'56
This blueprint for the progressive expansion of discursive
accountability does not answer-it deliberately postpones-questions
about first-order distribution. Hence Simon and other scholars carefully
use the term "bracket" to describe new governance's relation to the
distributive dimensions of law and legal institutions.' The term
suggests that the matter is not rejected or resolved yet is nonetheless not
essential to the unfolding of the new governance project. But by tracing
the discontinuities between new governance and neoliberalism-and the
continuities between new governance and liberal legalism-this Article
has sought to show that, perhaps more than any other theorist, it is
Hayek who would demand that new governance un-bracket, so to
unjust, because the results are not intended or foreseen, and depend on a
multitude of circumstances not known in their totality to anybody.
Id. at 70.
153. Id. at 69.
154. See, e.g., Sabel & Simon, supra note 27, at 397-98, 400-01; Dorf &
Sabel, supra note 17, at 288.
155. See, e.g., Charles Sabel, Dana O'Rourke, & Archon Fung, Ratcheting
Labor Standards: Regulation for Continuous Improvement in the Global Workplace,
Feb. 23, 2000, http://www2.law.columbia.edu/sabel/papers/ratchPO.html; see also
Sabel et al., supra note 28, at 8 (explaining that new governance "creates a
collaborative and mutual accountability of center to parts, parts to center, parts to other
parts, all to the whole enterprise - and to the public generally").
156. Cf Kathleen G. Noonan, Charles F. Sabel, & William H. Simon, Legal
Accountability in the Service-Based Welfare State: Lessons from Child Welfare
Reform, 34 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 523, 555 (2009) (linking accountability across layers
of review to the duty to articulate).
157. See supra note 131 and accompanying text; see also Alexander, supra note
2, at 133 ("Many new governance scholars . . . 'bracket' critical questions of
distribution and power."); Rodriguez-Garavito, supra note 2, at 209 ("[Tlhe
governance paradigm tends to bracket power asymmetries.").
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speak, and make explicit (and defend if it can) its vision of distributive
justice.
The term "bracket" could indicate that new governance architects
are unwilling to advocate for particular social objectives, but they
nonetheless believe that through the expansive frameworks of
accountability they design, individuals will use reason to improve
organizations and advance the ends of distributional equity. This
hypothesis, which I am proposing, flows readily from Sabel's rejection
of Hayek's radical theories of epistemic constraints and my description
of new governance as a democratized, reconstructed form of liberal
legalism. On this reading, there is little, if any, justification for new
governance to bracket, rather than discursively engage, liberal concerns
about social distribution and justice. To the contrary, it would seem that
new governance proponents should themselves view the extent to which
their dialogic processes produce equitable outcomes on the ground as
direct endorsements (or indictments) of their methods.
But it is also possible that the term bracket indicates a different
notion; namely, that new governance architects suspect that to remedy
historical injustices that elude individual causation or to reconcile
reasons that are internally conflicted, individuals and groups must
return questions of justice to where Hayek found them: in the realm of
the wordless and inexpressible. Brackets would thus signify new
governance's own deferral of meaning to a realm beyond the reach of
explicit reason. On this reading, Sabel and other new governance
theorists have yet to make clear their own assessments of the limits of
the scalar range of reason. As a result, they have also yet to suggest
whether the irrationalism of social justice is, following Hayek, a cause
for its disavowal or, reminiscent of left critiques of liberal legalism,
grounds for its embrace.
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